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 The Prospects and Challenges of Educational Reform 
for Latino Undocumented Children: An Essay 
Examining Alabama’s H.B. 56 and Other State 
Immigration Measures  
María Pabón López, Diomedes J. Tsitouras, & Pierce C. Azuma
 ∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND ALABAMA’S H.B. 56 
In May 2010, First Lady Michelle Obama was visiting a suburban 
Washington, D.C. elementary school when a second grader said to her, 
“[m]y mom . . . says that Barack Obama is taking everybody away that 
doesn’t have papers.”1  Mrs. Obama responded, “that’s something that 
we have to work on, right? . . .  To make sure that people can be here 
with the right kind of papers, right?  That’s exactly right.”2  The young 
girl then disclosed, “[b]ut my mom doesn’t have any papers.”3  If this 
second grade girl had been in Alabama, after the enactment of Ala-
bama’s House Bill 56 (“H.B. 56”), the school officials would have been 
                                                                                                                           
 ∗ María Pabón López, Dean and Judge Adrian G. Duplantier Distinguished Professor of 
Law, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, A.B. Princeton University, J.D. University 
of Pennsylvania School of Law; Diomedes J. Tsitouras, B.S. Cornell University, M.P.A., Cornell 
University, J.D., Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis;  Pierce C. Azuma, B.A., Tulane 
University, J.D. Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.  Dean López appreciates the 
kind invitation of Professor Ediberto Román to present an earlier version of this paper at the 
panel on “The Possibilities for Immigration Reform” at the “Latinos and Latinas at the Epicen-
ter of American Legal Discourse” (“LLEADS”) #2 Conference, Florida International University 
School of Law, Miami, Florida, on February 24, 2011.  The authors are grateful to Brian C. Bar-
nes, Deputy Library Director of the Law Library at Loyola University New Orleans College of 
Law, who provided outstanding research support for this essay.  The authors thank Kenneth 
“Doug” Walker, Editor in Chief, Carlos Rodriguez-Cabarrocas, Managing Editor, and the rest of 
the Florida International University Law Review, for their excellent editorial work, for their 
consummate professionalism, and their extraordinary generosity in the preparation of this essay. 
 1 Stephanie Condon, Second Grader to Michelle Obama: “My Mom Doesn’t have any 
Papers,” CBS NEWS (May 19, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20005436-
503544.html (also recounted in Amici Curiae Brief for the National Education Association, the 
Alabama Education Association, and the National Education Association Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellants, infra note 55, at 31). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
232 FIU Law Review [6:231 
obligated to report the child’s mother’s violation of H.B. 56 or risk jail 
time.  
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court decided 
Plyler v. Doe in 1982,4 a case which guarantees undocumented stu-
dents access to a free public K-12 education,5 Latino undocumented 
students continue to experience daunting challenges to attend school.  
An example of such an obstacle is the recent enactment of Alabama’s 
H.B. 56.6  Enacted in June of 2011 as an immigration restriction meas-
ure,7 H.B. 56 has several provisions that directly and adversely impact 
the ability of undocumented children to attend school.8   
This essay analyzes the provisions of H.B. 56 that affect the edu-
cation of undocumented children and examines the constitutionality 
of the provisions in view of current federal law, as embodied in the 
Plyler case.  As immigration law is an area of federal legislative au-
thority, a key constitutional concern is whether the Alabama law is 
preempted.  Following the analysis of whether this law is preempted, 
this essay further discusses the recent litigation filed following the 
passage of this act.  We also examine other recently-enacted state anti-
immigrant measures that pose obstacles to undocumented students 
and conclude by offering thoughts regarding the use of children as 
pawns in the raging immigration debate in the United States.   
II.  OVERVIEW OF CURRENT FEDERAL LAW AND H.B. 56 
A. Plyler v. Doe 
The landmark case Plyler v. Doe established the legal norm that 
states may not restrict public education based on immigration status.9  
In Plyler, a Texas statute withheld funding for the education of un-
documented students and permitted school districts to ban undocu-
mented students from enrolling if they did not pay for their school-
ing.10  At issue was whether the Texas statute violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11  The Court held in the 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).  For a recent in-depth and excellent scholarly analysis 
of this case, see MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYLER V. 
DOE AND THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOL CHILDREN (2012). 
 5 See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
 6 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 2). 
 7 United States v. Alabama, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1292 (N.D. Ala. 2011); 2011 ALA. LAWS 
535 (H.B. 56 § 2). 
 8 Beason-Hammon Ala. Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 
56 § 2). 
 9 Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
 10 Id. at 202. 
 11 Id. 
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affirmative,12 using an elevated form of rational basis review.13  The 
Court stated that “[i]t is difficult to understand precisely what the 
State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of 
a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to prob-
lems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.”14  
In Plyler, for the first time, the Supreme Court clearly stated that 
undocumented persons are protected under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15  Thus, the undocumented 
plaintiff children used the Equal Protection Clause to challenge the 
state of Texas’s denial of free public K-12 education.16  The Court per-
formed an Equal Protection analysis, starting with the recognition that 
education is “perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.”17  The Court found that the state’s denial of an educa-
tion to undocumented students could hardly be considered rational 
unless it furthered some substantial state goal.18  In assessing the ra-
tionality of the Texas statute, the Court warned that the cost to the 
nation and to the innocent children involved must be taken into ac-
count.19  The Court also found that “it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu-
nity of an education,”20 and that because the state took it upon itself to 
provide an education to children, it had to be made “available to all 
on equal terms.”21  
Expressing concern that it would be unfair to penalize undocu-
mented students for their parents’ unlawful presence in the United 
States,22 the Court found that undocumented children “can affect nei-
ther their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”23  The Court con-
cluded that there could be no rational justification for penalizing the 
children for their presence in the country because the Texas law was 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Id. at 222. 
 13 Id. at 224.  
 14 Id. at 230. 
 15 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 213; see also Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act, and Un-
documented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 443 (2004) (discussing how “[p]rior to 
Plyler, the Supreme Court had never taken up the question of whether undocumented aliens 
could seek Fourteenth Amendment equal protections”). 
 16 See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
 17 Id. at 222 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 18 Id. at 224. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 223 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 220. 
 23 Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). 
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directed towards children and imposed its discriminatory burden on 
the basis of a characteristic over which the children had no control.24 
B. Examination of H.B. 56 and its Provisions that Implicate Plyler 
H.B. 56 has several sections that pose a threat to an undocu-
mented student’s Plyler-based access to a K-12 education: specifically, 
Sections 5, 8, 13, and 28.25  Section 28 is particularly concerning since it 
contains extensive information-gathering requirements that may hin-
der school enrollment for undocumented children.26  Section 28(a)(1) 
mandates that school officials inquire as to whether the enrolled child 
“was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States.”27  Section 
28(a)(2) asks parents to provide a valid birth certificate for the child.28  
If the parent cannot produce one, he or she may produce a document 
establishing citizenship or immigration status, or a sworn declaration 
that the child is a “citizen or an alien lawfully present in the United 
States.”29  If neither of these can be presented, the child is deemed to 
be “an alien unlawfully present in the United States.”30  
Administrators use the information from these questions to pre-
pare an annual document to the Alabama Department of Education.31  
This document reports the number of undocumented students en-
rolled in the district.32  The Alabama Department of Education then 
uses the data to prepare an annual report to the state legislature on 
the costs associated with the school attendance of these undocu-
mented students.33  The law expressly permits state and local officials 
to share this information with the federal government.34  Section 28 is 
of particular concern because of the chilling effect that it may have on 
the enrollment of undocumented children whose parents may fear 
deportation.35 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See id. 
 25 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 §§ 5, 8, 13, 28). 
 26 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28). 
 27 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28 (a)(1)). 
 28 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28 (a)(2)).  
 29 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28(a)(2)). 
 30 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28(a)(3)). 
 31 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28(d)(1)-(5)). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id.  
 35 See MARIA PABON LOPEZ & GERARDO R. LOPEZ, PERSISTENT INEQUALITY: 
CONTEMPORARY REALITIES IN THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED LATINA/O STUDENTS 40 
(2010) (discussing the chilling effect as an area of concern for schools in enrolling undocumented 
students). 
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Other provisions, such as Sections 5, 8, and 13 of H.B. 56, also 
pose challenges regarding the education of undocumented students.36  
For example, Section 5(f) requires employees of the state (including 
those at schools) to “report any violations of the Act.”37  Hence, any 
inadvertent disclosure of an illegal immigrant being employed in vio-
lation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Act would have to be reported.38  
This could be done innocently, for example, by a young child, who may 
speak of his or her undocumented parents being at work, much in the 
same manner as the young girl in the Michelle Obama story discussed 
above.39 
Section 13 of the Alabama law raises additional concerns.40  For 
instance, Section 13(a)(1) makes it a crime to “[c]onceal, harbor, or 
shield . . . an alien from detection in any place in [Alabama], including 
any building or means of transportation, if the person knows . . . the 
alien has come to, has entered, or remains in the United States in vio-
lation of federal law.”41 Section 13(a)(2) makes it a criminal offense to 
encourage someone known to be an undocumented alien to “reside in 
[Alabama].”42  Furthermore, Section 13(a)(3) prohibits the knowing 
“transportation of undocumented alien in furtherance of the unlawful 
present of the alien in the United States.”43  The provisions in Section 
13 interfere with the Plyler mandate in at least two ways.  First, these 
provisions may criminalize the actions of teachers, school administra-
tors, and bus drivers who interact daily with undocumented students 
and their parents.  Even if these provisions are not construed to crimi-
nalize the actions of teachers, school administrators, and bus drivers 
who interact daily with undocumented students and their parents, 
their existence may still cause the chilling effect discussed above.44   
Finally, Section 8 of H.B. 56 bans undocumented aliens from at-
tending public colleges in Alabama.45  Other states such as Virginia 
and North Carolina have preceded Alabama in such a ban.46  Although 
the only federal district court opinion on point suggests that this sec-
                                                                                                                           
 36 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 §§ 5, 8, 13). 
 37 Id. (H.B. 56 § 5(f)). 
 38 Id. (H.B. 56 §§ 11, 15).  
 39 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
 40 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 13). 
 41 Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(1)). 
 42 Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(2)). 
 43 Id. (H.B. 56 § 13 (a)(3)). 
 44 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 45 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 8). 
 46 See Danielle Holley-Walker, Searching for Equality: Equal Protection Clause Challenges 
to Bans on the Admission of Undocumented Students to Public Universities, 2011 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 357, 361. 
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tion would pass constitutional muster,47 the section does not comport 
with Plyler’s promise of educational equality for undocumented stu-
dents.48  While Plyler is distinguishable from Section 8 because it per-
tains to a K-12 education, rather than Section 8’s focus on higher edu-
cation, in cases following Plyler, the Supreme Court has “emphasized 
the importance of states providing college and graduate education.”49 
C. H.B. 56 Section 28 Likely Violates Plyler v. Doe 
Section 28, which requires the data collection as discussed above,50 
contravenes Plyler.51  Alabama’s undocumented students have to con-
tend with an indirect barrier to school enrollment in the form of an 
information collection or registration scheme.52  This scheme acts to 
chill the guaranteed free public education Plyler offers. 
What makes Plyler unique are the strong public policy considera-
tions53 in favor of the education of the undocumented children.  As a 
result of Plyler, it has been a common practice to advise school dis-
tricts against rules that would create a “chilling effect,”54 particularly, 
rules that would leave undocumented parents afraid of sending their 
children to school for fear of being reported to the authorities.  Ten 
states have specific guidance that instructs schools not to collect in-
formation on immigration status.55  Pennsylvania has a state statute 
that prevents school districts from inquiring about students’ immigra-
tion status.56  Prior to the enactment of H.B. 56, the Alabama Educa-
tion Department advised its school districts not to inquire into the 
citizenship status of children enrolling in public schools.57  Further, the 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004).  Notably, the court 
decision did not address the Equal Protection clause.  See Holley-Walker, supra note 46, at 361.  
 48 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 49 See Holley-Walker, supra note 46, at 363.  
 50 See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. 
 51 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 28). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
 54 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 55 Brief for the National Education Association, the Alabama Education Association, and 
the National School Boards Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants and 
Urging Reversal of the District Court’s Denial of a Preliminary Injunction, at 12-14, Hispanic 
Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 11-14535-CC (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 2011) (providing list and 
cites of states). 
 56 Id. at 14; see also 22 PA. CODE § 11.11(d) (2011). 
 57 Alabama Department of Education, Legal Cases Related to English Language Learners, 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS, http://alex.state.al.us/ell/node/58 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012) 
(discussing that the Plyler “court ruled that public schools may not . . . [e]ngage in any practice to 
‘chill’ the right of access to school[, r]require students or parents to disclose or document their 
immigration status[, or m]ake inquiries of students or parents that may expose their undocu-
mented status”). 
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Federal Department of Education has circulated a “Dear Colleague” 
letter, advising states and localities on the consequences of possibly 
violating Plyler by “[taking] action to discourage the participation of 
students that could be viewed or would likely result in denying access” 
to public schools.58 
In addition to guidance from the states and the federal govern-
ment, LULAC v. Wilson, the only case addressing the issue since Ply-
er, is also persuasive.59  In LULAC, a California district court invali-
dated a state statute that required schools to ask about applicants’ 
immigration status and required denial of admission to students found 
to be undocumented.60 
Plyler, however, is not only contravened by statutes, such as the 
one in LULAC that bar academic admissions for undocumented stu-
dents.61  For instance, while H.B. 56 only requires Alabama schools to 
gather information for a statewide report, and it does not require 
schools to deny admission, the statute is still problematic from the 
perspective of undocumented students’ access to education.62  Sure, 
the argument can be made that H.B. 56’s information-gathering re-
quirements are benign and can assist the state.  For example, at least 
one scholar has stated the state of Texas in Plyler “failed to offer any 
credible supporting evidence that the proportionally small diminution 
of funds on each child . . . will have a grave impact on the quality of 
education.”63  The Plyler Court also stated “the record in no way sup-
ports . . . that exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve 
the overall quality of education in the state.”64  Scholars who support 
H.B. 56 assert that Alabama, unlike the State of Texas in Plyler, is only 
seeking to gather immigration status information so that it could offer 
the “credible supporting evidence” which the Plyler Court found lack-
ing.65  Then, 
[i]f the data shows that providing free education to those who are 
unlawfully present . . . has no significant impact on education or 
its costs . . . the Alabama law will . . . not alter the status quo that 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, Hispanic 
Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 11-2484, 2011 WL 2654277 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2011), available 
at http://www.2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201101.pdf. 
 59 LULAC v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56). 
 63 John Eastman, Editorial, Permissible and Sensible, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/04/should-alabama-schools-help-catch-illegal-
immigrants/alabamas-immigration-law-is-permissible-and-sensible.  
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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has existed since Plyler.  But if the data shows that providing a 
free public education to illegal immigrants severely undermines 
the quality, and/or drastically increases the cost, of education for 
those who are lawful residents and citizens, the state will have 
met an important caveat in the Plyler decision itself.66  
Scholars who support the Alabama statute and use this “credible 
supporting evidence” rationale, misquote and misinterpret Plyler.67  
The correct quote from Plyler reads: “[t]here is no evidence in the re-
cord suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on 
the State’s economy.”68  To the contrary, the available evidence sug-
gests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing 
their labor to the economy and tax money to the state fisc.”69  Further, 
the Plyler Court was concerned about creating a “permanent subclass 
of illiterates” that would lead to an increase in “unemployment, wel-
fare, and crime.”70  Hence, even if Alabama was able to evidence a 
large cost associated with educating undocumented students, such evi-
dence would not be enough to justify the statute.  The Plyler Court 
would not have been persuaded by that information alone.  Alabama 
would have to show that the costs of denying an education are greater 
than the future costs associated with more unemployment, welfare, 
crime, loss of “the tax money [undocumented aliens provide] to states” 
and “contributions to the economy.”71  There will never be a time when 
the benefits of education to society will be less than those of denying 
an education.  In the Supreme Court’s words, our public school system 
has “supreme importance” as the “primary vehicle for transmitting 
‘the values on which our society rests.’”72 
By analogy, imagine that the administrators of New York City de-
cided that it was not going to provide police service to the South 
Bronx.  The City would state that it does not have enough funding to 
provide these services, and it is not in the interest of officer safety 
since this area is too dangerous.  Under the logic of Section 28, if the 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 227. 
 69 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982). 
 70 Id. at 230. 
 71 Peter Shapiro, Editorial, Be Careful What You Wish For, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/04/should-alabama-schools-help-catch-illegal-
immigrants/be-careful-what-you-wish-for-alabama (The “contributions to the economy” in the 
form of low wage work may be a particularly large cost.  Professor Spiro writes that, “[a]cross the 
state line in Georgia, farmers are bleeding money as they find themselves with no one to bring in 
the harvest.”).  
 72 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Ambach v. 
Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)). 
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City could gather information showing the benefits of not providing 
this service were great enough, the City would be justified in not doing 
so.  Like education, however, it is hard to see how the cost savings in 
not providing police would be preferable to the costs associated with 
anarchy and loss of property and life that would most likely result.  
Providing basic law enforcement is preferred to non-enforcement, just 
like education is preferred to no education. 
Furthermore, current understanding of the benefits associated 
with education is even greater today than when the Court decided 
Plyler.  There is ample evidence showing the economic returns of an 
education; for example, the Census Bureau has found that college 
graduates earn almost double the amount that high school graduates 
earn.73  Another study has shown that an additional high school gradu-
ate yields a public benefit of $209,000 in more tax revenue and less 
government expenditure.74 
Even as a research study, Section 28 is not a good practice.  If the 
statute was enacted for the purpose of studying the costs associated 
with undocumented immigration, it will not succeed in achieving its 
goal.  It is known that persons will alter their behavior when they 
know they are being studied.75  Here, undocumented immigrants know 
their status is being scrutinized when the school officials ask for that 
information.  Thus, undocumented students and their parents will alter 
their behavior accordingly.  The information gathered by Section 28 
will likely decrease enrollment either because undocumented families 
will know the state is keeping tabs on them and their children, or be-
cause they are afraid their immigration status will be revealed to fed-
eral authorities. Thus, any enrollment numbers will likely be smaller 
than the real numbers.  Consequently, the costs would be under-
counted.  Early reports show that there is a decrease, not just in un-
documented student enrollment, but Latino student enrollment over-
all in Alabama.76  This may be because there are mixed status families 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Jennifer Cheeseman Day & Eric C. Newburger, The Big Payoff: Educational Attainment 
and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 2002), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf. 
 74 Clive Belfield, Henry Levin, Peter Muennig & Cecilia Rouse, The Costs and Benefits of 
an Excellent Education for All of America’s Children, CENTER FOR COST-BENEFIT STUD. OF 
EDUC. TCHRS. C., COLUM. UNIV. (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.cbcse.org/media/download_gallery/Leeds_Report_Final_Jan2007.pdf.  
 75 An example of this phenomenon is the Hawthorne Effect, in which research subjects 
alter their behavior when they know they are being observed.  See Michel Anteby & Rakesh 
Khurana, A New Vision, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/hawthorne/09.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
 76 Alan Gomez, Alabama Immigration Law Marked by Hispanic School Absences, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-10-02/Alabama-
immigration-Hispanic-school-absences/50638454/1; see also Alabama: Many Immigrants Pull 
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with both documented and undocumented members.  Since persons 
can be prosecuted for encouraging undocumented immigrants to re-
main in Alabama,77 it is plausible that even a U.S. citizen or a lawfully-
present immigrant relative is afraid to enroll an undocumented child 
in school.  It is even more likely that such persons do not know all of 
H.B. 56’s provisions and are just afraid of it in general. 
Certainly such a fear would be warranted since the legislature 
showed an animus toward undocumented people when it enacted the 
bill.78  Alabama House Majority Leader, Micky Hammon, chief spon-
sor of H.B. 56, stated, “[w]hen this bill passes and is signed into law, I 
think you will see illegals leaving north Alabama and going elsewhere 
. . . .  This bill is designed to make these people export themselves.”79  
He further exclaimed, “[w]e really want to prevent illegal immigrants 
from coming to Alabama and prevent those who are here from put-
ting down roots.”80 
A better way to study the costs associated with undocumented 
students would be to take a small sample of certain representative 
schools throughout the state.  Courts may prefer such a sampling ap-
proach since it is narrowly tailored and would have a less significant 
impact on undocumented people.  Such an approach would also be 
cheaper for the state and school districts to implement since it would 
require less time and human resources.  
D. H.B. 56 Section 28 May Cause FERPA Violations  
The application of Section 28 may violate the Family Education 
and Privacy Rights Act (FERPA).81  This federal law prohibits the dis-
closure of certain identifying information about a student unless his or 
her parent gives written consent.82  Although the federal law contains 
certain exceptions, none of them apply with respect to Section 28 of 
                                                                                                                           
Children from Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/us/alabama-many-immigrants-pull-children-from-
schools.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Alabama%20may%20children%20pull%20children%20from%2
0school&st=cse. 
 77 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
 78 M.J. Ellington, House OKs Immigration Bill, THE TIMES DAILY (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http:///www.timesdaily.com/article/20110406/NEWS.110409882?Title=House-OKs-immigration-
bill. 
 79 Id.  
 80 R. Cort Kirkwood, Alabama Gov. Signs Immigration Bill; Leftists Outraged, THE NEW 
AM. (June 10, 2011), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/immigration/7817-alabama-gov-
signs-immigration-bill-leftists-outraged.  
 81 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2006). 
 82 Id. 
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the Alabama law.83  A potential FERPA violation could occur if a 
school district turns over specific information on the undocumented 
student to the Alabama Department of Education for purposes of 
submitting the report to the legislature.  A FERPA violation would 
also likely occur if the school decides it has to comply with Sections 5 
and 6 of H.B. 56, which prohibit any “policy or practice” that “limits 
communication” with federal enforcement, and shares information 
about undocumented students or parents with federal authorities.84 
III.  LITIGATION OVER H.B. 56 
Once Governor Bentley signed H.B. 56 into law, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, a civil rights group, and a group of clergy filed 
suits in federal court with the result that only some sections of the law 
were preliminarily enjoined.85 
A. Section 8 of H.B. 56 Enjoined on Preemption Grounds 
In Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama enjoined 
Section 8 of H.B. 56, which prohibited aliens “not lawfully present” in 
the United States from enrolling in public post-secondary education.86  
The second sentence of Section 8 defined aliens “not lawfully present 
in the United States” as those that do not “possess lawful permanent 
residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101.”87  However, the Alabama legislature did not include refugees 
and asylum seekers, who, under U.S. immigration law, are lawfully pre-
sent under other provisions of federal law, just not under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101.88  Because only Congress may classify aliens,89 and since Ala-
bama’s classification of an alien contradicted federal law, Section 8 
was preempted.90  
In Bentley, the plaintiff, Esayas Haile, sought a preliminary in-
junction claiming that he was a refugee and had standing to challenge 
                                                                                                                           
 83 34 C.F.R. § 99.31 (2012).  For further information, see Questions and Answers for School 
Districts and Parents: Documentation, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201101.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).  
 84 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 §§ 5(a)-6(a)). 
 85 Campbell Robertson, Alabama Wins in Ruling on its Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/us/alabama-immigration-law-
upheld.html?ref=us.  
 86 Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley,  No. 11-2484, 2011 WL 5516953, at *24 (N.D. 
Ala. Sept. 28, 2011).  
 87 Id. at *20.  
 88 Id.  
 89 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).  
 90 Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala., 2011 WL 5516953, at *23.  
242 FIU Law Review [6:231 
Section 8 because of his denial of an education.91  Interestingly, the 
federal government did not challenge Section 8 in its suit based on 
preemption.  The Court suggested that if the Alabama legislature re-
drafts Section 8 so there is no contradiction with federal law, and it 
passes this new version, such a new Section 8 could stand under a pre-
emption analysis since it seems this was a drafting error and not a 
purposeful attempt to exclude asylum seekers or refugees.92  
B. H.B. 56’s Section 13 Enjoined on Preemption Grounds 
As previously discussed,93 Section 13(a)(1) makes it unlawful for a 
person to “conceal, harbor, or shield . . . or conspire to conceal, harbor, 
or shield [an alien]. . . from detection in any place in this state . . . ”,94 
and Section 13(a)(2) makes “induc[ing]” an alien to come to or reside 
in the state unlawful.95  Section 13(a)(3) criminalizes the “transport, or 
attempt to transport, or conspire to transport an alien” whose pres-
ence in the United States is in violation of federal law.96  Section 
13(a)(4) prohibits entering into rental agreements with unlawful 
aliens.97 
The District Court granted a preliminary injunction invalidating 
Section 13 on preemption grounds.98  It noted that “Congress has pro-
vided a uniform, comprehensive scheme of sanctions for those who 
unlawfully enter the United States.”99  The district court used a “con-
flict preemption” analysis to invalidate the section.  The federal gov-
ernment asserted that the state law “conflict[ed] with the operation of 
federal immigration law.”100  Alabama claimed that it was “concurrent 
enforcement” with federal law.101  However, the court disagreed and 
concluded that Section 13 “actually prohibit[ed] conduct allowed un-
der federal law and criminaliz[ed] conduct that is lawful under federal 
law.”102  For example, federal law provides an exemption for clergy un-
der its transportation and harboring scheme.103  Section 13 had no such 
exemption; instead, Section 13 only had exemptions for first respond-
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. at *20.  
 92 See id. at *21-22. 
 93 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
 94 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(1)). 
 95 Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(2)). 
 96 Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(3)). 
 97 Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(4)). 
 98 United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011).   
 99 Id. at 1330.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006). 
 100 Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1330. 
 101 Id. at 1331. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id.  
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ers and protective service providers.104  Section 13(a)(2) was also un-
constitutional because federal law did not make it a crime to “induce 
an illegal alien to enter Alabama from another state,” only the induc-
ing of an alien to enter the United States.105 The court also found con-
flicts between federal law and state law because Section 13(a)(3) and 
(4) had elements not present in the federal statute, such as punishing 
“transportation conspiracy” and “rental agreements.”106  There is also a 
concern that Alabama courts would interpret “harboring” differently 
than federal courts and impose their own law.107 The court distin-
guished recent cases from other states in which federal courts did not 
find preemption when prosecuting employers for hiring undocu-
mented aliens.108  According to the court, those cases concerned areas 
of license and regulation of employment where Congress has specifi-
cally preserved authority for the states.109  
C. Section 13 Could Also Have Been Found Unconstitutional Using 
a Plyler Analysis 
Section 13 would punish the “transportation” and “harboring” of 
aliens present in Alabama in violation of immigration law.110  It would 
also make it illegal to “encourage” such aliens to remain in Alabama.111  
In the H.B. 56 litigation, civil rights plaintiffs raised the possibility that 
a violation of Plyler could result if schools could not transport un-
documented children on buses.112  Also, if school officials protected an 
undocumented child in an emergency or when the parent was not 
available, a conflict with the anti-harboring provision would exist if 
that could be considered “harboring.” 
D. Inconsistency Between the Eleventh Circuit and the Alabama 
District Court  
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama did not 
enjoin Section 28.113  The court failed to do so even though the federal 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Id. at 1329. 
 105 See id. at 1334. 
 106 Id. at 1329, 1324.  
 107 Id. at 1335.  
 108 Id. at 1331 (distinguishing Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1979 
(2011); Arizona Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Napolitano, Nos. CV07 1355 PHX NVW, CV07 1684 
PHX NVW, 2007 WL 4570303, at *13-14 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2007)).  
 109 Id. 
 110 See 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 13). 
 111 Id. 
 112 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 232, Hispanic Interest Coal. of 
Ala. v. Bentley, No. 11-2484, 2011 WL 2654277 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2011). 
 113 Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (N.D. Ala. 2011). 
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government lawsuit asserted that Section 28 created a “mandatory 
data collection, classification, and reporting requirement”, and was an 
“impermissibl[e] … registration scheme for children (and derivatively 
their parents)” akin to the one the Supreme Court invalidated in 
Hines v. Davidowitz.114  In Hines, the Supreme Court held that a state 
“cannot inconsistently with the purposes of Congress, conflict or inter-
fere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional 
or auxiliary regulations.”115  The Pennsylvania statute required that all 
aliens over eighteen register annually and carry an alien registration 
card.116  The state law was unconstitutional because its independent, 
state-specific registration scheme conflicted with a federal Alien Reg-
istration Act, and was an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”117   
In failing to enjoin Section 28 of H.B.56, the district court distin-
guished Section 28 from the Pennsylvania statute because it did not 
“attempt to register anyone, or create registration requirements in 
addition to those established by Congress in the INA.”118  The court 
did not elaborate on how exactly H.B. 56 was different.  Yet two weeks 
later, in an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals enjoined Section 28.119  The appeals court did not elaborate on its 
rationale.  
Even though the Eleventh Circuit enjoined Alabama’s enforce-
ment of Section 28 on interlocutory appeal by the federal govern-
ment,120 it remains a threat to the education of undocumented children.  
Its “chilling effect” has already resulted in many Latino children’s ab-
sences.   
                                                                                                                           
 114 Id. at 1348 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)). 
 115 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941). 
 116 Id. at 59-60.  
 117 Id. at 67. 
 118 Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. 
 119 United States v. Alabama, Nos. 11-14532, 11-14535, 2011 WL 4863957 (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 
2011).  
 120 Id.  The Eleventh Circuit did not elaborate on the merits of the federal government’s 
claim concerning Section 28 except to state that the stringent requirements for granting the 
injunction pending appeal had been met.  Id.  Interestingly, however, in addressing the first factor 
for granting the injunction, the Circuit Court stated that “[a] substantial likelihood of success on 
the merits requires a showing of only likely or probable, rather than certain, success.”  Id. (quot-
ing Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005)).  Furthermore, the 
court noted that restraint must be shown in enjoining legislative enactments before there is a full 
trial on the merits unless demanded by the Constitution.  Id.  Although Alabama is enjoined 
from enforcing Section 28 now, it is unclear what the future of the Act will be after a trial on the 
merits.  
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IV.  RECENT ANTI-IMMIGRANT LEGISLATION IN OTHER STATES AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS 
While Alabama’s H.B. 56 is certainly the most comprehensive 
and far-reaching measure, states such as Georgia, South Carolina, 
Utah, and Indiana have enacted statutes that impact the education of 
undocumented children.  In each of these states, the U.S. Department 
of Justice, along with various civil rights, religious, community, and 
business groups have already raised challenges to the laws on the basis 
of federal preemption, as well as constitutional protections under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
A. Utah 
Utah H.B. 497, signed into law in March of 2011, includes the re-
quirement for the determination of immigration status by state and 
local law enforcement.121  The Act also amends Section 76-9-2901, con-
cerning the transporting or harboring of illegal aliens, to make it 
unlawful to “encourage or induce an alien to come to, enter, or reside 
in [the] state . . . .”122  Utah’s law does not require the same strict immi-
gration status information gathering as Alabama’s H.B. 56, nor does it 
include a broad provision concerning the transportation or harboring 
of undocumented aliens.  Importantly, unlike Alabama’s H.B. 56, 
Utah’s amendment to the harboring laws would likely not criminalize 
a parent’s transportation of an undocumented child within the state 
since Section 76-10-2901(2)(a) requires that the transportation be 
done “for commercial advantage or private financial gain.”123 
On May 3, 2011, the National Immigration Law Center, ACLU, 
and ACLU of Utah filed a class action seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief on the grounds that federal law preempts and that H.B. 497 
violates the constitutional protections of inter alia, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.124  The court granted a 
Temporary Restraining Order in favor of Plaintiffs and stayed the 
execution of H.B. 497125 until hearing of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction on February 17, 2012.126 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, ch. 21, 2011 UTAH LAWS 21 (codified as 
amended at 2011 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-1001 to -1009). 
 122 Id. § 76-10-2901(2)(c). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 10, Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Her-
bert, No. 11-401 (D. Utah May 3, 2011). 
 125 Order, Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, No. 11-401, Doc. No. 45 (D. Utah May 11, 
2011). 
 126 Order to Consolidate Cases and to Set Briefing Schedule, Utah Coal. of La Raza v. 
Herbert, No. 11-401, Doc. No. 129 (D. Utah Nov. 28, 2011). 
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B. Georgia 
Georgia’s H.B 87127 includes provisions that make it a state crime 
to harbor or transport undocumented persons within the state.128  The 
Act states that “[a] person who, while committing another criminal 
offense, knowingly and intentionally transports or moves an illegal 
alien in a motor vehicle . . . shall be guilty of the offense of transport-
ing . . . an illegal alien.”129  This places undocumented parents in a very 
dubious position.  Since traffic violations are considered “criminal 
offenses” under the statute, it is foreseeable that criminal penalties 
could be applied to parents who are transporting undocumented chil-
dren to school.  Certainly, the thought of such extreme consequences 
as a result of taking undocumented children to school will be a factor 
in deciding whether to send them at all. 
On June 8, 2011, Plaintiffs’ nonprofit organizations, business asso-
ciations, and certain individuals filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion to enjoin portions of H.B. 87 that were to be effective on July 1, 
2011.130  Plaintiffs’ nonprofit organizations challenged the Act on the 
grounds of preemption, and on other constitutional grounds.131  Ac-
cordingly, the District Court enjoined the enforcement of Sections 7 
and 8 of H.B. 87 on the basis of federal preemption and held that the 
Act did not violate the other liberties and rights asserted by Plain-
tiffs.132  The state has appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals.133  
C. Indiana 
In May of 2011, the Indiana House and Senate passed S.B. 590 
and H.B. 1402.  S.B. 590 requires state and local law enforcement offi-
cers to enforce federal immigration laws and verify the immigration 
status of individuals that they lawfully stop, detain, or arrest.134  Addi-
                                                                                                                           
 127 Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, 2011 GA. LAWS 252 (H.B. 
87). 
 128 Id. (H.B. 87 § 7, Art. 5 (codified as amended at 2011 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-200(b) 
and 201(b)). 
 129 Id. § 16-11-200(b) (2011). 
 130 Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1322-23 (N.D. Ga. 
2011). 
 131 Id. at 1323, 1328. 
 132 Id. at 1340. 
 133 Brief for Judicial Watch, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant, Ga. 
Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (No. 11-13044). 
 134 Act of May 10, 2011, 2011 IND. SEA 590, § 3 (codified as amended at IND. CODE § 5-2-
19-5(a) (2011)).  Individual alien plaintiffs filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of S.E.A. 
590 and sought to enjoin Sections 18 (creating violation under Indiana law for any person to 
knowingly offer or accept a consular identification card as valid form of id) and 19 (authorizing 
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tionally, H.B. 1402, and S.B. 590 Sections 12, 13, and 14 exclude un-
documented students from receiving in-state tuition rates at public 
universities and excludes them from receiving financial or scholarship 
aid.135   
Although the primary education of undocumented students is not 
being facially restricted or inhibited, the state of Indiana is clearly lim-
iting the educational advancement of these individuals.  The conse-
quences of this are the same as those that concerned Justice Brennan 
in Plyler: the “depriv[ation] . . . of any disfavored group of an educa-
tion . . . foreclose[s] the means by which that group might rise to the 
level of esteem in which it is held by the majority.”136  Importantly, it 
must be recognized that Plyler was decided nearly three decades ago, 
a time when much more could be accomplished professionally with a 
high school diploma.  In today’s technology-dependent world, access 
to higher education is more important than ever before.  Indiana’s 
denial of access to undocumented students only serves as a mecha-
nism to further disenfranchise an educationally disadvantaged group. 
D. South Carolina 
Similar to Georgia’s H.B. 87,137 South Carolina’s S.B. 20 provides 
strict penalties for knowingly transporting or harboring a person un-
lawfully in the country, making it a felony.138   Thus, parents, friends, 
and other persons run the risk of a felony arrest by driving an un-
documented student to school or having him or her in their home.139  
Although the law does not require that schools review and compile 
statistics on the immigration status of their students, the increased 
risks that arise as a result of the new measure will likely have a nega-
tive effect on the undocumented student population.  It will become 
increasingly difficult for undocumented aliens to remain in South 
                                                                                                                           
law enforcement to make warrantless arrests based on immigration status) of the Act.  Id.  The 
District Court granted plaintiffs preliminary injunction as to Sections 18 and 19 on the grounds 
of preemption, the Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process.  Buquer v. City of 
Indianapolis, 799 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011). 
 135 Act of July 1, 2011, ch. 11, 2011 Ind. S.B. 590 §§ 12-14 (codified as amended at IND. CODE 
§§ 21-11-7.5-1, -14-11-1, and -15-2-5 respectively (2011)). 
 136 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982). 
 137 See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text. 
 138 Act of June 27, 2011, 2011 S.C. S.B. 20 § 4, (codified as amended at S.C. CODE § 16-9-460 
(2011)) (under Georgia’s H.B. 87, a similar offense is only a misdemeanor).  
 139 Parents of Students Worry over South Carolina Immigration Law, FOX NEWS (Nov. 16, 
2011), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/11/15/s-carolina-immigration-law-worries-
latino-students/. 
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Carolina with this new mandate from the Legislature emphasizing 
immigration enforcement.140 
As with the other state legislation discussed above, S.B. 20 has al-
so been challenged by a number of individuals, civil rights and non-
profit groups,141 as well as the U.S. Department of Justice.142  On De-
cember 22, 2011, the District Court for the District of South Carolina 
issued an order granting private plaintiffs’ and the Federal Govern-
ment’s motions for preliminary injunction as to Sections 4, 5, and 6 of 
the Act.143  The injunction was granted on the basis of preemption.144  
Accordingly, those sections of S.B. 20, that make transporting and har-
boring undocumented aliens state felonies are enjoined pending a full 
trial on the merits. 
V.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
Plyer provides that state laws that interfere with the guarantee of 
a free public education are ineffective tools for immigration reform.145  
The use of undocumented schoolchildren as pawns in the raging im-
migration debate is inappropriate and inconsistent with Plyler.  The 
protection Plyler affords has endured thirty years, in large part be-
cause it is a high water mark in United States jurisprudence that rec-
ognizes this country’s status as a nation of immigrants.  The Supreme 
Court in Plyler recognized the innocence of undocumented children 
and that they should not be penalized for the acts of their parents, 
which cannot be changed by an innocent child seeking an education.146  
Creating a climate of fear that would induce the parents of more than 
a thousand Latino students in Alabama to be absent from school147 is 
not in the best interest of the children, the state, or the nation.  Even 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Act of June 27, 2011, 2011 S.C. S.B. 20 § 17 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE § 23-6-60 
(2011)), creates the Illegal Immigration Enforcement Unit within the Department of Public 
Safety.  The task of the Unit is to enforce federal and state immigration laws throughout the 
state. Id.  The Unit will be separate and distinct from all other state law enforcement agencies 
and will have jurisdiction in all counties.  Id. at §§ 23-6-60(C)(2)(c)-(d).  
 141 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Lowcountry Immigration Coal. v. 
Haley, No. 11-2779, 2011 WL 4824401 (D.S.C. Oct. 12, 2011). 
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 145 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 146 Id. at 220  (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). 
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those who support H.B. 56 are concerned about targeting children, as 
evidenced by the words of this Alabama resident,  “I think a lot of 
what we're hearing is panic, and if (immigrants are) here illegally they 
should be scared, but I don't see any reason to drag children into 
something that's not even sorted out yet.”148 
 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. (quoting statement of Garrett Harrison). 
 
